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DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF NEW
YORK'S PERMANENT NEGLECT STATUTE
Joseph R. Carrieri*
I. Introduction
Since the early 1970s the well-being of foster children has been the
subject of increased attention.' Legislation has advanced the protec-
tion of the foster child,2 while the courts have begun to emphasize
the child's best interests in determining whether parental rights to
custody should be terminated and the child freed for adoption.3
Early decisions had stressed the rights of the natural parents,
often to the exclusion of the child's welfare.' Recent legislation and
judicial decisions indicate that parental rights will be terminated
where the best interests of the child so require. For example, family
court review of the status of every child in foster care is now man-
dated at least once every twenty-four months.' This procedure has
successfully placed foster children in adoptive homes and returned
others to their natural parents.' Other recent decisions and statutes
have clarified the rights of parties in abandonment,' permanent
* B.S. Fordham University; LL.B. Fordham University School of Law. Member of the New
York Bar. Mr. Carrieri is a member of the firm of O'Brien, Carrieri & Lynch, Mineola, L.I.,
N.Y.
1. Hall, The Waning of Parental Rights, CAMBRIDGE L. J. 248 (1972); see Gordon,
Terminal Placements of Children and Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The New
York Permanent Neglect Statute, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 215 (1971); 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 785
(1970).
2. See, e.g., 1976 N.Y. Laws chs. 666-68.
3. See, e.g., In re Kenneth M., 383 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Fam. Ct. 1976); In re Adoption of N.,
78 Misc. 2d 105, 355 N.Y.S.2d 956 (Sur. Ct. 1974).
4. See, e.g., In re Susan W. v. Talbot G., 34 N.Y.2d 76, 312 N.E.2d 171, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1974); In re Bistany, 239 N.Y. 19, 145 N.E. 70 (1924).
5. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 392(10) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
6. See, e.g., In re Zwiebel, 79 Misc. 2d 366, 358 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Faro. Ct. 1974); In re
Spencer, 74 Misc. 2d 557, 346 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Fam. Ct. 1973); In re Cynthia S., 74 Misc. 2d
935, 347 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Fam. Ct. 1973).
7. In re Anonymous, 40 N.Y.2d 96, 351 N.E.2d 707, 386 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1976); In re Orlando
F., 40 N.Y.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 711, 386 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1976). Both of these decisions made it
easier for agencies to free foster children for adoption and emphasized the best interest of the
child. In Anonymous, the New York Court of Appeals held that where an agency can prove
abandonment of a child for six months, it is not required to prove that it used diligent efforts
to strengthen the parent-child relationship. 40 N.Y.2d at 98, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 63. In Orlando
F., the New York Court of Appeals held that a finding of permanent neglect will be supported
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neglect,8 and adoption proceedings,9 and have expanded the rights
of putative fathers.'0
This Article will examine New York's permanent neglect statute
as a means of terminating the custodial rights of natural parents to
free children for adoption.
II. Permanent Neglect Proceedings
The custody of a destitute or dependent child may be committed
to an authorized agency or foster parent in various ways. For exam-
ple, a natural parent may voluntarily terminate his right to the
guardianship and custody of a child under section 384 of the New
York Social Services Law." That section requires the parent to exe-
cute a written surrender of his rights whereupon the guardianship
and custody of the child is committed to an authorized agency. 2
A child may also be freed for adoption when the natural parent
has actually abandoned the child. 3 Section 384-b(4)(b) of the Social
Services Law permits the guardianship and custody of a child to be
committed to an authorized agency or foster parent if: 4
[tihe parent or parents, whose consent to the adoption of the child would
otherwise be required . . . . abandoned such child for the period of six
where a natural parent has failed either to maintain contact with or plan for the future of
his child. 40 N.Y.2d at 98, 351 N.E.2d at 711, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 63. See text accompanying
notes 68-80 infra.
8. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 666, §§ 14, 16.
9. Id. §§ 9-13.
10. Id. ch. 665, §§ 1-7. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the
Supreme Court held that an unwed father's right to the custody of his child could not be
terminated without compliance with the hearing requirements of the due process clause. The
New York courts have not interpreted Stanley as requiring any drastic modification of the
rights of putative fathers. See In re Malpica-Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 370
N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976); In re Kenneth M., 87 Misc. 2d 295,
383 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Fam. Ct. 1976). See 5 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 175 (1976).
11. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
12. Id. The courts have held that upon the proper execution of a written surrender for
purposes of adoption, a contractual relationship arises between the natural parent or parents
and the accepting agency. Nevertheless, this contract is subject to judicial supervision and
may be set aside prior to the time formal adoption occurs. People ex rel. Anonymous v.
Saratoga County Dep't of Public Welfare, 30 App. Div. 2d 756, 291 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d Dep't
1968); Schenectady County Dep't of Social Services v. Patricia Ann S., 73 Misc. 2d 104, 341
N.Y.S.2d 169 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
13. N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
14. Id.
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months immediately prior to the initiation of the proceedings under this
section ...
Institution of a guardianship proceeding on the ground of perma-
nent neglect is another method by which a child may be freed for
adoption. 5 Under section 384-b(7) of the Social Services Law, a
"permanently neglected child" is defined as: 6
a child who is in the care of an authorized agency and whose parent or
custodian has failed for a period of more than one year following the date such
child came into the care of an authorized agency substantially and continu-
ously or repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the
child, although physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the
agency's diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relation-
ship when such efforts will not be detrimental to the best interests of the
child.
If a court determines that a child has been permanently neglected
by his parent, it may commit the guardianship and custody of the
child to an authorized agency or foster parent. 7
Prior to January 1, 1977, courts had to rely on section 611 of the
New York Family Court Act" for the statutory definition of a
15. Id. § 384-b(7). Under section 384-b of the Social Services Law, there are two other
grounds upon which the guardianship and custody of a child can be committed to an author-
ized agency or foster parent: (1) if both of the child's parents are dead, and no guardian has
been lawfully appointed; and (2) if the child's parent or parents "are presently and for the
foreseeable future unable, by reasons of mental illness or mental retardation, to provide
proper and adequate care [for him] .... " Id. §§ 384-b(4)(a), 384-b(4)(c).
16. Id. § 384-b(7)(a).
17. See id. § 384-b(3).
18. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 611 (McKinney 1976). The predecessor statute to section 611 was
enacted in 1959. 1959 N.Y. Laws ch. 450. The Governor's Memorandum of Approval unders-
scored the purpose that the statute was designed to achieve:
The purpose of these bills is to provide procedures with adequate safeguards to permit
the adoption of a permanently neglected child, without the consent of his parents or
parent.
Under existing law a great many children are doomed to grow up in institutions or
foster homes at public expense and are prevented from forming normal, lasting family
relationships, because minimal contacts between a parent and a child who remains in
an institution or foster home act as a bar against a judicial finding that the child has
been abandoned. Such a finding is necessary in order to permit the adoption of the
child without parental consent and it cannot be made even where the contacts between
parent and child are so infrequent and superficial as to be completely meaningless.
These bills act to remedy this situation and at the same time protect the rights of a
parent who has a real interest in his or her child, but due to financial or other circum-
stances is unable to have the care and custody of the child. The bills have been
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"permanently neglected child." Since the statutory language of sec-
tion 384-b(7) of the Social Services Law is essentially the same as
the former language of section 611 of the Family Court Act, 9 the
courts may continue to rely on judicial decisions which have inter-
preted section 611.20
Prior to the enactment of section 611 of the Family Court Act, the
natural parents' consent was required in order to free a child for
adoption,' unless the natural parent or parents had in fact com-
pletely abandoned the child. The Legislature enacted section 611 to
provide a method for the termination of parental rights where a
natural parent's contacts with his child had been so infrequent or
meaningless as to amount to a de facto relinquishment of any paren-
tal responsibilities. 2
In a proceeding to terminate a natural parent's custody on the
ground of permanent neglect, section 614 of the Family Court Act
reviewed and universally approved by public and private child welfare agencies, the
courts dealing with adoptions, and interested persons generally.
1959 N.Y. Laws 1749.
19. Prior to January 1, 1977, section 611 of the Family Court Act contained the following
language:
A "permanently neglected child" is a person under eighteen years of age who is in
the care of an authorized agency, either in an institution or in a foster home, and whose
parent or custodian has failed for a period of more than one year following the date
such child came into the care of an authorized agency substantially and continuously
or repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child, although
physically and financially able to do so, notwithstanding the agency's diligent efforts
to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship when such efforts will not be
detrimental to the moral and temporal welfare of the child ...
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 611 (McKinney 1975), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976). See text
accompanying note 16 supra.
20. See, e.g., In re Denlow, 87 Misc. 2d 410, 384 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Fam. Ct. 1976); In re Orzo,
84 Misc. 2d 482, 374 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Fam. Ct. 1975).
21. See Susan W. v. Talbot G., 34 N.Y.2d 76, 312 N.E.2d 171, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1974).
The court stated that, "[elven where the flame of parental interest is reduced to a flicker
the courts may not properly intervene to dissolve the parentage." Id. at 80, 312 N.E.2d at
174, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 38. In support of its holding the court cited In re Bistany, 239 N.Y. 19,
145 N.E. 70 (1924). In Bistany, Judge Cardozo said that in order for petitioning adoptive
parents to prevail in a proceeding based on abandonment by the natural parents, the petition-
ers "'ust be able to show that even though the parents be given the benefit of every contro-
verted fact, a finding of abandonment follows as an inference of law." Id. at 21, 145 N.E. at
70. The court also stated that "the order ... [denying the petition for adoption] must stand
unless we are prepared to hold that by acts so unequivocal as to bear one interpretation and
one only the parents manifested an intention to abandon the child forever." Id. at 24, 145
N.E. at 71.
22. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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requires the petitioner to show that:23 (1) the child is in the care of
an authorized agency; 4 (2) the child is under eighteen years of age;
(3) the agency has made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen
the parental relationship; (4) notwithstanding the agency's efforts,
the natural parent has failed substantially and continuously to
maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child for a period
of more than one year since the child's commitment to agency care;
(5) the parents are physically and financially able to maintain such
contacts and formulate plans for the child's future; and (6) the best
interests of the child require that an authorized agency or foster
family have custody of him. Thus, a determination of the degree to
which both the agency and the natural parents have discharged
their respective obligations is essential to the court's decision in a
permanent neglect proceeding.
A. The Agency Obligation To Use Diligent Efforts
Section 384-b(7)(a) of the Social Services Law provides that be-
fore a child can be declared permanently neglected, the agency to
whose care he is committed must use "diligent efforts to encourage
and strengthen the parental relationship. ' 2 5 Through amendments
which went into effect in January 1977, the Legislature for the first
time has undertaken to define "diligent efforts":"
"[D]iligent efforts" shall mean reasonable attempts by an authorized
agency to assist, develop and encourage a meaningful relationship between
the-parent and childi including but not limited to: (1) consultation and
cooperation with the parents in developing a plan for appropriate services to
the child and his family; (2) making suitable arrangements for the parents
to visit the child; (3) provision of services and other assistance to the parents
23. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 614(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
24. Id. § 614(1)(b). Section 371(10) of the Social Services Law defines the term "agency"
as:
Any agency, association, corporation, institution, society or other organization which
is incorporated or organized under the laws of this state with corporate power or
empowered by law to care for, to place out or to board out children, which actually
has its place of business or plant in this state and which is approved, visited, inspected
and supervised by the board or which shall submit and consent to the approval,
visitation, inspection and supervision of the board as to any and all acts in relation to
the welfare of children performed or to be performed under this title.
N.Y. Soc. SEv. LAw § 371(10) (McKinney 1976).
25. N.Y. Soc. Saav. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
26. Id. § 384-b(7)(f).
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so that problems preventing the discharge of the child from care may be
resolved or ameliorated; and (4) informing the parents at appropriate inter-
vals of the child's progress, development and health.
Because the provision generally codified prior judicial determina-
tions, an examination of these decisions will aid in the interpreta-
tion of this new provision.
Agency responsibilities include the duty to discharge its obliga-
tions efficiently and in good faith. In re Joyce Ann R.17 was a fact-
finding proceeding 8 in which the agency alleged that the natural
mother was guilty of neglect and that her rights to custody of the
child should be terminated permanently. The child had been in the
custody of the same foster parents for six years." During that time
the agency and the natural mother had been unable to formulate
any plan respecting the child's future." The court denied the peti-
tion, holding that the agency had been too one-sided in its efforts
to strengthen the parental relationship: "An ultimatum from the
agency no matter how reasonable standing alone does not meet its
statutory obligation of 'diligent efforts' to encourage and strengthen
the parental relationship."'"
The court further noted the inequality of position inherent in
negotiations between the agency and the natural mother and dis-
cussed the responsibilities of both:32
27. 82 Misc. 2d 730, 371 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Fain. Ct. 1975).
28. Upon the filing of a petition seeking termination of parental rights, the court issues a
summons. On the return day of the summons, the court will schedule a "fact-finding" hear-
ing. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 616 (McKinney Supp. 1976). If the agency is able to prove its case
by a preponderance of the evidence at the fact-finding, the court will order a dispositional
hearing to determine whether the interests of the child require that the parent's custody be
terminated. Id. § 625(a). The court must also determine what order of disposition is to be
made. Id. § 631.
29. 82 Misc. 2d at 731, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
30. Id., 371 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
31. Id. at 732, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
32. Id. at 732-33, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 610. The element of inequality of position between
agency and natural parent was again discussed by the same court in In re Sydney, 84 Misc.
2d 932, 377 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Fam. Ct. 1975). In Sydney the family court found that the agency
had not met its "special preliminary burden" of showing diligent efforts, and that the natural
mother's actions in procuring more suitable housing and better paying employment
amounted to "'planning' by conduct," Id. at 934, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 909, notwithstanding the
agency's allegations of "failure to contact and failure to plan." Id. The court opined:
The parties are by no means dealing on an equal basis. The parent is by definition
saddled with problems: economic, physical, sociological, psychiatric, or any combined
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As to the [natural mother], the cases establish that "negative" argument
tending merely to veto agency proposals does not constitute planning. Stan-
dards of substantiality, constructiveness, and attempted implementation
must be met.
However, the agency and the natural parent cannot be viewed as equals
in the planning process. First, almost by definition, the agency operates from
a background of professional resources and accumulated experience; this
parent from a background of mental stress, financial handicap, and insecur-
ity. Second, the statute in haec verba states the duty of the agency to make
"diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship."
The agency must therefore perform efficiently, diligently, and in good
faith.. The parent must demonstrate effort, good faith, and minimum ade-
quacy as a planning parent.
Application of the diligent efforts requirement often demands
flexibility.33 A determination that an agency did not exercise dili-
gent efforts should not affect the result where the child's well-being
will be jeopardized by a continued relationship with an unqualified
natural parent. In In re Ray A.M.,34 the appellate division cautioned
that time must not be wasted in measuring the exact degree of effort
required on the part of the agency when the behavior of the natural
parent is so bizarre that chances of resuming a normal relationship
with her child are virtually nonexistent."
In re Ray A.M. was a permanent neglect proceeding instituted by
the Spence-Chapin Adoption Service. After the child had first been
in the custody of the New York City Department of Child Welfare
for two and a half years, that agency placed her in a foster home
where she resided for a period of three years prior to the commence-
ment of the proceeding. The record before the court spanned a pe-
riod of over two years. During that time there had been some nine-
teen hearings. The court described the natural mother as
"aggressive, paranoid and immature." Testimony adduced in the
thereof. The agency in contrast is vested with expertise, experience, capital, manpower
and prestige. Agency efforts correlative to their superiority is obligatory.
Id.
33. See, e.g., In re Ray A.M., 48 App. Div. 2d 161, 368 N.Y.S.2d 374 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 37
N.Y.2d 619, 339 N.E.2d 135, 376 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1975); In re Denlow, 87 Misc. 2d 410, 384
N.Y.S.2d 621 (Faro. Ct. 1976).
34. 37 N.Y.2d 619, 339 N.E.2d 135, 376 N.Y.S.2d 431, aff'g 48 App. Div. 2d 161, 368
N.Y.S.2d 374 (2d Dep't 1975).
35. 48 App. Div. 2d at 164, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
36. Id. at 162, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 375.
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family court had portrayed a bleak picture involving child batter-
ing, long periods of neglect, and failure to maintain contact with the
agency.37 The court held that the child was permanently neglected,
and refused to consider an argument based on alleged agency failure
to use diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship: 31
This is not simply a case where the neglect by the parent may have been
matched by the neglect of the agency to attempt the strengthening of the
parental relationship. . . . It may be that the adoption agency could have
tried harder to encourage the natural mother-child relationship in order to
satisfy the most searching mind that no more could reasonably be done.
However, we must not get lost in an analysis of the niceties of the precise
degree of required diligence of effort where the life-style and apparent socio-
pathology of the mother (joined with her undoubted past neglect) indicate a
bleak future indeed for the child. As stated in Matter of Raymond "M. "...
"The welfare of the child is not served if permanent termination is delayed
in order to penalize the agency for its failure to make diligent efforts or in
order to give the natural parent recompensate against the agency in the form
of a second chance."
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the appellate divi-
sion 3 and vigorously endorsed the soundness of the holding below:40
Only by sophistic analysis can it be argued that the child care agency failed
in its duty to "encourage and strengthen the parental relationship" between
this unfortunate child and the troubled and trouble-making mother. The
mother exhibited not isolated instances of parental incapacity but a pattern
of intransigence, instability, and abusive conduct toward the child which,
37. Id., 368 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
38. Id. at 164, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 377, quoting In re Raymond "M.", 81 Misc. 2d 70, 79, 364
N.Y.S.2d 321, 329 (Fam. Ct. 1975)(citation omitted).
39. One justice in the appellate division dissented from the result reached by the majority
in In re Ray A.M., thus enabling the natural mother to appeal to the court of appeals as of
right. 48 App. Div. 2d at 165, 368 N.Y.S. 2d at 378 (Martuscello, J., dissenting). See
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5601(a) (McKinney 1963).
40. 37 N.Y.2d at 623-24, 339 N.E.2d at 138, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 435. The court of appeals
noted the change in the law that had been brought about by amendment of section 614 of
the Family Court Act. When the proceeding was commenced in the trial court, former section
614 required that permanent termination of parental rights be in the "moral and temporal"
interests of the child. Section 614 was amended in 1975 with "best" interests of the child
substituted for "moral and temporal" interests. The court of appeals elected to decide the
case on the basis of the "best" interests standard, but concluded that "[t]he result in this
case, on its facts, would be the same under either statutory standard." Id. at 622, 339 N.E.2d
at 137, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 433. Article 6 of the Family Court Act governs the procedural aspects
of permanent neglect proceedings commenced under section 384-b of the Social Services Law.
N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 611-34 (McKinney 1975), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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perforce, must have practically limited the agency in its efforts, if the best
interests of the child were to govern the actions of the parties and the agencies
involved ....
The attitude of the parent can thus be seen as a factor which in some
cases can lessen the agency's burden of showing that it employed
diligent efforts.
Also germane to the degree of diligent effort required of the
agency is the natural parent's way of life. In re Anthony L. "CC"
41
was a permanent neglect proceeding in which the natural mother
was a reformed heroin addict. She had been almost constantly in-
carcerated since the birth of her child. The mother had failed to
keep in regular contact with either the child or the agency and
''never actually formulated or seriously contemplated any plans for
the future of her infant, ' 42 despite the diligent efforts of the agency
to persuade her to do so. The appellate division sustained the family
court's finding that the agency had attempted to induce the mother
to have some relationship with the child, as her circumstances and
way of life would permit. 43 Despite such efforts, the parent did not
respond. The family court's order finding permanent neglect was
unanimously affirmed.44
An agency is expected to use "diligent efforts to encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship when such efforts will not be
detrimental to the best interests of the child." 4 If an agency deter-
41. 48 App. Div. 2d 415, 370 N.Y.S.2d 219 (3d Dep't 1975).
42. Id. at 418, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 419, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
45. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976). The shift in emphasis
from parental rights to the child's best interests has been viewed as an enlightened develop-
ment. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976), was a
proceeding brought by a natural mother seeking custody of her child. The child had voluntar-
ily been placed with a friend of the family. No statutory provision was directly applicable
since the placement here was private and unsupervised. The court decided the case on the
basis of common law principles, but commented on the progression in the law with respect
to the custodial rights of natural parents:
The day is long past in this State, if it had ever been, when the right of a parent to
the custody of his or her child, where the extraordinary circumstances are present,
would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the child, on the theory
solely of an absolute legal right. Instead, in the extraordinary circumstance, when there
is a conflict, the best interest of the child has always been regarded as superior to the
right of parental custody. Indeed, analysis of the cases reveals a shifting of emphasis
rather than a remaking of substance. This shifting reflects more the modem principle
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mines that such diligent efforts will not be in the best interests of
the child, there must be some evidence to support its decision. In
In re Denlow" the agency sought to terminate parental rights based
on allegations of both abandonment and permanent neglect. The
child had been removed from the natural mother's residence pur-
suant to the emergency powers of the Department of Social Serv-
ices. The child was sixteen months old when he was removed." He
had lived with the same foster parents for a period of ten years. The
natural mother recognized that she was unable to care for the child,
and therefore acquiesced in agency custody." However, the natural
mother always expressed an interest in her child and a desire to have
that a child is a person, and not a subperson over whom the parent has an absolute
possessory interest. A child has rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magni-
tude . ..
Recently enacted statute law, applicable to related areas of child custody such as
adoption and permanent neglect proceedings, has explicitly required the courts to base
custody decisions solely upon the best interest of the child. . . . Under these statutes,
there is no presumption that the best interest of the child will be promoted by any
particular custodial disposition. Only to this limited extent is there a departure from
the pre-existing decisional rule, which never gave more than rebuttable presumptive
status, however strongly, to the parent's "right."
Id. at 546-48, 356 N.E.2d at 281-82, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824-26 (citations omitted).
46. 87 Misc. 2d 410, 384 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Fain. Ct. 1976).
47. Id. at 413, 384 N.Y.S. 2d at 626. The agency exercised the emergency powers conferred
by section 1024 of the Family Court Act. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 1024 (McKinney 1975).
That section provides for removal of a child by an agency without parental consent or a prior
court order where "the child is in such circumstance or condition that his continuing in [his]
place of residence or in the care and custody of the parent or person legally responsible for
the child's care presents an imminent danger to the child's life or health..." Id. § 1024(a)(i).
The agency removing the child may do so without a court order where there is not time to
apply for one, but if these emergency powers are exercised, the court must be informed of
the removal. Id. § 1024(a)(iii). In Denlow, the agency did not take the steps required to
confirm the propriety of the removal. The court noted that the child had been taken "under
somewhat questionable circumstances" and that the 'separation' over [10] years [had]
been without legal sanction and in plain violation of law." 87 Misc. 2d at 413, 384 N.Y.S.2d
at 626. The court said that the agency's "circumvention of law [was] tolerable only because
the child [had] always continued in foster care with the mother's consent." Id. at 413-14,
384 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
48. Id. at 414, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 626. The natural mother even acquiesced in the repeated
denial of her requests to see the child and in the agency's ultimate termination of visitation
when the agency advised her that this was in the child's best interests. Id. at 415, 384
N.Y.S.2d at 627. She had five other children and drew support only from public assistance.
The court analogized the position of the natural mother to that of the "old woman who lived
in a shoe." Id. at 420, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
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him back some day.49
The family court in Denlow dismissed the agency's petition on the
merits for its failure to establish a showing of abandonment or per-
manent neglect by the natural mother. 0 The agency had alleged
that the mother was indifferent toward the child." It had stopped
the child's visits to his natural mother's home when he complained
to a caseworker. 2 However, the agency also turned aside the natural
mother's repeated requests to visit her child for a variety of rea-
sons.5 3 Based on this evidence, the court concluded:5"
[lit cannot be said that [the agency] extended itself by diligent efforts to
promote the parent-child relationship. This responsibility was given minimal
recognition at best. The agency picked the foster parents here. The heavy
investment of service to the foster family necessarily worked against any plan
of reunion between mother and child. There is no proof-and, indeed, the
record does not even suggest it-that such efforts would have been detrimen-
tal to the moral and temporal welfare of the child. The respondent was not
an unfit mother due to alcohol addiction, drug usage, mental illness, behav-
ioral deviation or other vice found to exist in any of the cases terminating
parental rights ...
• . . The court can terminate parental rights only where the parent has failed
to maintain contact or plan for the child despite the agency's diligent efforts
... . More is needed than has been shown in this case before the court will
take this extreme and drastic step.
49. Id. at 415, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
50. Id. at 422, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
51. Id. at 421, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
52. Id. at 415-16, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 627. The court paused to consider the significance of
the child's expressed desire to be adopted by the foster parents:
This 12-year-old boy can hardly be expected to appreciate the full meaning and legal
consequences of adoption. His immature wish and desire is largely emotional and the
product of inevitable psychological conditioning. It is by no means determinative in a
case like the present that entails far-reaching and life-long effects. ... Should the day
of repentance and change of mind ever dawn, then would come the real tragedy for
Derek.
Id. at 416 n.8, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 627 n.8.
53. Id. at 414, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
54. Id. at 419-21, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 630-31. But the court's constraint in making its decision
is indicated by its assessment of the facts:
The realities of the situation are that Derek does not really know his mother, that she
is unable to meet his special needs if we accept agency standards and opinion, and
that the foster family of 10 years is meeting these needs and willing to adopt him. None
of this is a substitute for law.
Id. at 421, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
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Thus, the New York courts have repeatedly recognized an
agency's duty to use diligent efforts to strengthen a parent-child
relationship." Where it seems certain that an agency has not used
diligent efforts to strengthen a parent-child relationship, the courts
should demand evidence which establishes that the natural parent's
"life-style and apparent sociopathology . . . indicate a bleak future
.. .for the child.""
B. Parental Failure Substantially and Continuously To
Maintain Contact With or Plan For the Child's Future
The most serious failure on the part of a parent which could lead
to termination of custodial rights is to have no contact with the child
for a period of one year.57 Where a parent has not visited, supported,
or otherwise communicated with his child for this length of time, he
will be deemed to have abandoned the child.58 Such a course could
lead to a complete severance of parental rights.
Prior to the 1975 amendment of section 611 of the Family Court
Act, 59 a few insubstantial contacts by the parent were sufficient to
prevent the termination of parental rights. ° Evidence of such con-
tacts is no longer sufficient to preclude a finding of abandonment
or permanent neglect as a matter of law.'
In In re Coddington2 respondent natural mother voluntarily
55. See, e.g., In re Orzo, 84 Misc. 2d 482, 374 N.Y.S.2d 554 (Fam. Ct. 1975); In re
Coddington, 84 Misc. 2d 253, 376 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Fain. Ct. 1975); In re Joyce Ann R., 82 Misc.
2d 730, 371 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Fain. Ct. 1975).
56. In re Ray A.M., 48 App. Div. 2d 161, 164, 368 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 37
N.Y.2d 619, 339 N.E.2d 135, 376 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1975).
57. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976). See In re Coddington, 84
Misc. 2d 253, 376 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Fain. Ct. 1975).
58. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
59. 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 704, § 2 (codified at N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 611 (McKinney 1975)),
as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976)).
60. See, e.g., Susan W. v. Talbot G., 34 N.Y.2d 76, 312 N.E.2d 171, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1974).
61. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976), effective January 1, 1977,
provides:
[Elvidence of insubstantial or infrequent contacts by a parent with his or her child
shall not, of itself, be sufficient as a matter of law to preclude a determination that
such child is a permanently neglected child. A visit or communication by a parent with
the child which is of such character as to overtly demonstrate a lack of affectionate
and concerned parenthood shall not be deemed a substantial contact.
Id.
62. 84 Misc. 2d 253, 376 N.Y.S.2d 387 (Fam. Ct. 1975).
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placed her two children with the Department of Social Services.
During the next three years, respondent visited her children thirteen
times. Only one of these visits occurred in the year preceeding the
litigation. The Department had repeatedly warned the respondent
of the consequences if she refused to make permanent plans for her
children. 3 Despite these warnings, the mother failed to plan for her
children or to take advantage of the Department's efforts to train
her for employment. 4
In concluding that the respondent had permanently neglected her
children,6" the family court refused to follow the New York Court of
Appeals decision in Susan W. v. Talbot G." In Susan W. the court
of appeals stated that "abandonment can be made out only from 'a
settled purpose to be rid of all parental obligations and to forego all
parental rights.' "8 The Coddington court rejected this so called
"settled purpose rule" in cases of permanent neglect because it
placed greater emphasis upon the parent's intent rather than the
effect of the parent's conduct upon the child." Relying on the 1975
amendment to section 611 of the Family Court Act, the family court
stated: 9
The result of applying the "settled purpose rule" would be, in most cases, as
is illustrated here, to enshrine parental rights at the cost of leaving the child
forever in limbo wholly at the mercy of parents' wavering and fluctuating
intent. . . .[Iln cases brought by the Commissioner of Social Services for
the permanent termination of parental rights ...the parents' purpose or
intent, while not wholly irrelevant, is certainly not controlling.
The determination of what constitutes lack of planning on the
part of a parent is a somewhat more complicated problem. In some
situations, a finding of lack of parental planning is not difficult.
63. Id. at 254-55, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
64. Id. at 255, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 389-90.
65. Id. at 259, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
66. 34 N.Y.2d 76, 312 N.E.2d 171, 356 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1974). In Susan W. the natural mother
and her new husband petitioned for the adoption of the mother's three children. The natural
father refused to consent to the adoption. Section 111 of New York's Domestic Relation Law
requires that a natural parent give his consent to the adoption of his child unless he has
abandoned the child. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1964), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1976).
67. 34 N.Y.2d at 80, 312 N.E.2d at 173, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 37, quoting In re Maxwell, 4
N.Y.2d 429, 433, 151 N.E.2d 848, 850, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283 (1958).
68. 84 Misc. 2d at 257-58, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
69. Id. at 258, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
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These would include situations where a parent had refused employ-
ment, adequate housing, or professional help with a drug or drinking
problem.7 One court has defined the duty of a parent with respect
to planning for the future of the child by saying that the "parent
must demonstrate effort, good faith, and minimum adequacy as a
planning parent."7' An examination of the cases which have consid-
ered the question of parental failure to plan suggests that the judici-
ary has not hesitated to terminate parental rights where the best
interests of the child so require.72
The New York Court of Appeals recently resolved a substantial
problem relating to the requirement to plan in In re Orlando F.73
Although the natural mother had maintained infrequent contact
with the child, the family court determined that the mother had
evinced a desire to obtain custody of the child74 and concluded that
the agency did not show a failure by the mother "to substantially
or continuously maintain contact with or plan for the future of the
child" for the requisite one year period. As a result, the family court
dismissed the agency's petition to terminate the natural mother's
custody of her child.75
The appellate division affirmed.7" The majority endorsed the fam-
ily court's view that either contact or planning for the future of the
child will defeat a petition seeking termination of parental rights on
the grounds of permanent neglect.77
Justice Theodore R. Kupferman dissented," maintaining that
section 611 of the Family Court Act required the parent both to
maintain contact and plan for the child's future.7"
The court of appeals modified the appellate division's order and
sustained the agency's petition."" The court stated that the words
70. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
71. In re Joyce Ann R., 82 Misc. 2d 730, 733, 371 N.Y.S.2d 607, 610 (Fain. Ct. 1975). See
text accompanying notes 27-32 supra.
72. See, e.g., In re Ray A.M., 37 N.Y.2d 619, 339 N.E.2d 135, 376 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1975);
In re Joyce Ann R., 82 Misc. 2d 730, 371 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Fain. Ct. 1975).
73. 40 N.Y.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 711, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 64 (1976).
74. 40 N.Y.2d at 108, 351 N.E.2d at 714, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
75. See id. at 106, 351 N.E.2d at 712, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
76. 50 App. Div. 2d 791, 377 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1st Dep't 1975).
77. Id., 377 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
78. Id., 377 N.Y.S.2d at 504 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
79. Id., 377 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
80. 40 N.Y.2d 103, 351 N.E.2d 711, 386 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1964).
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"maintain contact with or plan for" must be construed as setting
up separate requirements." It concluded that a finding of parental
failure to plan" is sufficient in itself to support a determination of
permanent neglect.13 Even where the parent has demonstrated an
intention to have the child returned and has maintained contact
with the child, the parent must take affirmative action to plan for
the child's future. 4 While the court decided that "substantially
plan" means to design and act to execute a feasible and realistic
plan, it refused to articulate a rigid definition: 5
81. Id. at 109-10, 351 N.E.2d at 714-15, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 66-67.
82. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 611 (McKinney 1975). N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(c)
(McKinney Supp. 1976), effective January 1, 1977, now defines the term "to plan for the
future of the child":
"IT]o plan for the future of the child" shall mean to take such steps as may be
necessary to provide an adequate, stable home and parental care for the child within
a period of time which is reasonable under the financial circumstances available to the
parent. The plan must be realistic and feasible, and good faith effort shall not, of itself,
be determinative. In determining whether a parent has planned for the future of the
child, the court may consider the failure of the parent to utilize medical, psychiatric,
psychological and other social and rehabilitative services and material resources made
available to such parent.
83. 40 N.Y.2d at 110, 351 N.E.2d at 715, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
84. Id. at 110-11, 351 N.E.2d at 715, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
85. Id. at 111-12, 351 N.E.2d at 716, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
In support of its conclusion that the requirements of contact and planning are to be read
in the disjunctive, the court noted that in 1973, section 611 was amended by inserting the
words "or plan" in place of the words "and plan," 1973 N.Y. Laws ch. 870, § 2. The court
also considered a statement made by State Senator Joseph R. Pisani made in support of this
amendment:
The purpose of the permanent neglect proceedings is to provide a procedure for the
permanent termination of parental rights by reason of permanent neglect of a child in
the foster care of an authorized (public or private) agency and to authorize such agency
to place the child for adoption.
The purpose of the proposed amendments is to redefine permanent neglect as being
established where the parent or custodian has failed "substantially and continuously
to maintain contact with the child" or where the parent or custodian has failed to
"plan for the return of the custody of the child." Under the present law both such
failure to maintain contact and failure to plan for the return of custody of the child or
to "plan for the future of the child" must be shown.
Where the parent or custodian fails in either respect, the child is left in limbo.
Thus, the relationship becomes meaningless where the parent or custodian visits so
infrequently that the child has no sense of belonging.
Where there is only occasional visitation, there is certain to be a failure to plan for
the return of the custody of the child. On the other hand, even where there is substan-
tial and continuous visitation, the parent or custodian may fail to take steps to end
the foster care status of the child and restore the child to a homelife with the parent
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We need not formulate, under the instant facts, an exact standard which
must be met in order to comply with the statutory mandate in light of
respondent's utter failure to exert even a minimal attempt to develop a plan
for her child's future. Indeed, each factual pattern will undoubtedly reveal
peculiarities of its own but the particular facts and totality of circumstances
must be scrutinized and weighed carefully in rendering decisions in such
delicate human affairs ....
Ill. Conclusion
There are any number of social problems which are almost impos-
sible to solve with unquestionable fairness to everyone, but which
cry out for uniform and just solutions. While legislation is never a
complete cure for such problems, it is the only significant vehicle
that a society such as ours can employ to arrive at fair and consis-
tent resolutions. Perhaps the most difficult area to regulate is the
determination of the varying degrees of value to assign to the rela-
tionships of family members. In the case of laws respecting the
rights of children and their natural parents, who for one reason or
another must be separated, precise determinations are almost im-
possible.
The law has moved slowly, but with a steady hand, to tip the
scales in favor of the interests of the children who become public
charges. This is a move in the right direction. The sensitivity mani-
fested by the legislative and judicial branches in solving problems
involving foster children is assuredly grounds for optimism that
government at all levels will give paramount consideration to those
who stand to lose the most by a cold analysis of relative legal rights.
or custodian. A child is no less in limbo when kept in foster care year after year when
the parent or custodian is physically and financially able to provide a home but fails
to do so.
As appears from Matter of Barbara P., the obligation of the parent or custodian to
"plan for the future of the child" means to plan for the return of the custody of the
child. The proposed amendment accordingly substitutes language which expressly so
provides.
Memorandum of Senator Joseph R. Pisani, reprinted in, 1973 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE
ANNUAL 35 (citations omitted).
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